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The Jurisdiction of Justice: Two 
Conceptions of Political Morality 
LARRY ALEXANDER* 
My topic in this essay is a major fault line within normative theory.  
More precisely, it is a major fault line within that part of a normative 
theory that deals with the content of our moral obligations to others.1  
When I refer to moral obligations here, I am referring to those acts that 
morality demands of us such that it permits force or its threat to be 
employed to secure those acts.  Moral obligations, as I use the term, are 
thus candidates for legal enforcement. 
I argue that much of what is debated within liberal political/moral 
theory can be usefully illumined by dividing liberal conceptions of 
justice into two major camps.  In one camp are those conceptions that 
are thoroughgoingly impartialist.  That is, their impartialism applies to 
any good over which people might make competing claims.  I shall refer 
to this group of conceptions as Unrestricted Impartialism, or UI. 
Opposed to this camp of liberal conceptions of justice is that group of 
 
 *  Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego.  I wish to 
thank the following: Richard Arneson, Steve Smith, and Chris Wonnell, for their 
comments; Jacinda Lanum for her research; Sara Moore for her typing; and Dean Daniel 
Rodriguez for a generous summer research stipend. 
 1. I shall thus not be discussing many other aspects of moral theory.  For 
example, I leave aside the entire field of metaethics, which deals with such matters as: 
To what do moral claims refer? Are they objective, and in what sense? How do they 
connect with facts in the world as science perceives them—are they constituted by, do 
they supervene upon, or are they identical to such facts? What is the connection between 
morality and reason? And what is the relation among morality, reason, and our 
motivational sources?  Nor shall I be dealing with such metaphysical/moral relationships 
as how free will and determinism bear on moral responsibility. Finally, there are 
normative questions about virtue, about supererogation, and about nonenforceable “moral 
oughts” that I am not concerned with here. 
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conceptions that limits impartialism to some goods but puts other goods 
beyond the writ of justice (enforceable morality).  I shall call this group 
of conceptions Restricted Impartialism, or RI. 
In this essay, my aim is to paint these two conceptions and their 
strengths and weaknesses using a very broad brush.  In philosophy, the 
devil is more frequently than not in the details, and broad brush strokes 
generally obfuscate more than illuminate.  Moreover, my métier tends to 
be fine analytical points and not big picture tableaux.  Nonetheless, not 
only do space limitations preclude in-depth analyses of the conceptions I 
discuss, but my message is a wholesale rather than a retail one, namely, 
that there is a single and major gulf dividing liberal conceptions of 
justice into these two distinct camps.  Analytical fine points about these 
conceptions are beside the point. 
I.  UNRESTRICTED IMPARTIALISM 
UI conceptions of justice operate with no restriction on their domain.  
That is, UI conceptions render any good eligible for distribution 
according to whatever conception of impartiality is chosen. 
UI conceptions differ among themselves along two axes.  First, they 
differ over whether goods should be distributed to maximize something, 
to equalize it, or to prioritize some beneficiaries of it relative to others, 
and over how the recipients’ responsibility for these circumstances and 
their virtues and vices should affect their distributive shares.  That is, 
these conceptions differ along this axis of distributional formulae.2 
The second axis along which these conceptions differ is the axis of 
what is to be distributed in pursuance of the chosen distributional 
formula.  Is it welfare, opportunity for welfare, capabilities, resources, 
Rawlsian primary goods, or some objective list of goods that should be 
maximized, equalized, and so on?  In other words, what is the currency 
that we are to distribute impartially? 
The distributional formulae and currency debates make up a 
substantial portion of the philosophical treatment of UI.  They are not 
my present concern, however, so I set their important and interesting 
issues aside.  Of more relevance to my topic here is a set of problems 
that bedevil all UI conceptions of justice, no matter how different they 
otherwise are from one another. 
The first problem is that of natural partiality toward kith and kin.  
 
 2. See generally Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism, 
110 ETHICS 339 (2000); G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 
906 (1989); RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE Chs. 2, 7 (2000); Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility, 111 ETHICS 548 (2001); 
ERIK RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 17–183 (1991). 
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People generally place the welfare of their families, friends, close 
associates, neighbors, and countrymen above that of distant strangers.  
Yet the UI stance on its face conflicts with such forms of partiality.3  
Because lives without the attachments that foster partiality appear 
stunted and less than fully human, the problem of natural partiality poses 
a severe threat to UI theories of justice. 
A second problem for UI theories of justice is that of self-effacement, 
a problem that is central to Bernard Williams’s criticisms of UI.4  Under 
UI, our attitude toward our life’s projects—those activities and 
commitments that invest our lives with meaning and value—must be a 
detached one.  We must be prepared to jettison any and all such projects 
whenever our pursuit of them becomes inconsistent with maximizing, 
equalizing, prioritizing, or maximining whatever UI tells us to maximize, 
equalize, prioritize or maximin.  The moral propriety of our projects is 
always contingent on the latest returns from the UI distributional 
formula calculus. 
Or, put differently, according to UI, we can only have one project to 
which we are psychologically attached, namely, to distribute goods that 
are UI currency according to UI distributional formulae.  All more 
specific projects are in service of and hostage to that master project. 
The self-effacement problem can be viewed as but a more general 
version of the natural partiality problem.  Our “projects” toward which 
we are partial include family, friendship, patriotism, and so forth, as well 
as our vocation, hobbies, causes, and the like. 
A third problem for UI theories is that of demandingness.  UI theories 
may require huge sacrifices of us.5  Utilitarianism, a UI theory, might 
 
 3. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 10–20 (1991); SAMUEL 
SCHEFFLER, BOUNDARIES AND ALLEGIANCES: PROBLEMS OF JUSTICE AND RESPONSIBILITY 
IN LIBERAL THOUGHT 97–110 (2001).  Richard Arneson believes that partiality towards 
kith and kin is reconcilable with UI, though it does entail dispositions to do wrong 
(violate UI morality).  See Richard J. Arneson, Consequentialism vs. Special-Ties 
Partiality, 86 THE MONIST 382 (2003).  See also Robert F. Card, Consequentialism, 
Teleology, and the New Friendship Critique, 85 PAC. PHIL. Q. 149 (2004) (arguing that 
friendship and consequentialism are fully compatible).  Garrett Cullity takes the view 
that UI entails the permissibility of partiality.  See Garrett Cullity, Asking Too Much, 86 
THE MONIST 402 (2003).  And for a recent attempt to reconcile UI with partiality 
towards friends, see Card, supra. 
 4. Bernard Williams, A critique of utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD 
WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 77, 77–150 (1973).  See also SAMUEL 
SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 7–10 (1982); Samuel Scheffler, 
Doing and Allowing, 114 ETHICS 215 (2004). 
 5. See, e.g., SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY 233–41 (1989); Bashshar 
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demand that some people sacrifice everything—their lives, their 
families, all their wealth—if doing so will somehow maximize aggregate 
welfare.  This is, indeed, a standard criticism of utilitarianism, namely, 
that it might permit some to be sacrificed for the good of the whole.  But 
all UI theories have this demandingness problem.  Equalizing welfare, 
for example, given some people’s seriously impaired ability to convert 
resources into welfare, may require huge and impoverishing transfers of 
resources to those people.  Moreover, any plausible version of equality 
of resources, primary goods, or objective list goods would count such 
capabilities as, for example, good health as UI currency.  But it is 
possible that some people’s health can be brought up to a level of 
equality only by redistributing resources in their direction to such an 
extent that everyone is left impoverished. 
As with the relation between the self-effacement problem and the 
natural partiality problem, the demandingness problem can be viewed as 
a more general version of the first two.  Giving up one’s attachments and 
one’s projects may be just instances of UI’s demandingness and on a par 
with giving up most of one’s resources. 
The fourth and final problem of UI theories of justice is that of 
nonrecognition of rights.  A simple example will illustrate this problem, 
which is endemic to all UI theories.  Suppose A has two healthy kidneys, 
and B is facing the prospect of kidney failure.  And suppose that we can 
remove one of A’s kidneys with little discomfort or risk to A and save 
B’s life by transplanting it in him.  Finally, suppose that doing this will 
maximize, equalize, etc. whatever currency the UI theory tells us to 
maximize, equalize, etc.  Under UI, A can have no valid objection to the 
harvesting of his kidney.  He has no right to his kidney that can trump 
the UI distributive formula.  His body, his labor, and his talents are not 
his in any sense that would connote that he has a right to them that 
would protect them from a UI-dictated redistribution.  That is what I 
mean when I say that UI theories have a problem of nonrecognition of 
rights. 
The nonrecognition of rights problem is related to the preceding three 
problems in the following way: If people had rights over their bodies, 
labors, and talents, rights that were strong enough to trump the UI 
distributional formula, then they might have moral space within which 
they could display partiality toward persons and projects and accumulate 
resources that were not subject to redistribution. 
 
Haydar, The Moral Relevance of Cost, 112 PHIL. STUD. 127, 127–34 (2003); Shelly 
Kagan, Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent Work on the Limits of 
Obligation, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 239, 239–40 (1984); TIM MULGAN, THE DEMANDS OF 
CONSEQUENTIALISM (2001); SCHEFFLER, supra note 4; Peter Singer, Famine, Affluence, 
and Morality, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 229, 238–39 (1972). 
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Proponents of UI theories employ different strategies for handling 
these four problems.  One strategy directed at the first two problems is to 
advocate a public/private distinction and then relegate UI to the public 
side, leaving individuals acting in their private capacities to be as partial 
as they wish toward people and projects.6  This strategy is, I believe, 
unsuccessful.  For one thing, I am highly doubtful that a line can be 
drawn between public and private in a way that is defensible as a matter 
of moral theory.  Government is not some sort of natural moral kind that 
is morally discontinuous from the individuals who elect it and run it; it 
is, therefore, quite difficult to justify “UI for government, partiality for 
individuals.”  Moreover, this strategy cannot even begin to cope with 
partiality toward one’s countrymen, given the absence of a global 
government to fill the UI role.  Finally, this strategy, even if it were 
successful in handling the problems of partiality, is not equipped to 
handle the problems of demandingness and nonrecognition of rights. 
Samuel Scheffler attempts to handle the first three UI problems by 
dropping strict impartiality and allowing each person to give his own 
interests—including family, friends, causes, and so forth—extra weight 
in the UI calculus.7  The problems with his approach have been 
extensively chronicled elsewhere.8  For one, his approach would lead to 
radically conflicting permissions, given that A can give his own welfare 
X times the weight that he must give B’s welfare, and B can give his 
welfare X times the weight that he must give A’s welfare.  Unless those 
permissions are supplemented by rights that block actions that are 
otherwise permitted, Scheffler’s weighted partiality theory will be 
incoherent.  But Scheffler wants to reject rights because he cannot 
understand why rights may not be violated even to prevent a greater loss 
of the interests rights protect.  (And “rights” that may be so violated are 
not really rights.)9 
An alternative approach to UI’s problems is advanced by Douglas 
 
 6. See, e.g., ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 61 
(1995). 
 7. See SCHEFFLER, supra note 4. 
 8. See, e.g., Larry A. Alexander, Scheffler on the Independence of Agent-
Centered Prerogatives from Agent-Centered Restrictions, 84 J. PHIL. 277, 278–83 
(1987). 
 9. It is arguable whether Scheffler is even a UI theorist, given that he allows for 
partiality.  I place him there primarily because he rejects rights and accepts 
consequentialism.  He is therefore clearly not an RI theorist.  Perhaps he defies 
categorization within any schema.  I mention him only to show that he provides the UI 
proponents no lever for overcoming the four problems. 
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Portmore.10  Portmore handles them by driving a wedge between what 
morality requires and what is rational.  Most moral theorists, because 
they consider moral reasons to be overriding ones, do not accept any gap 
between reason and morality.  Portmore, however, is willing to accept 
that what morality requires of one is something that would be on balance 
irrational (against the balance of reasons).  Thus, UI moralists may 
dictate that we treat a stranger’s welfare or projects as of equal 
importance to that of our children’s welfare or our own projects, but the 
balance of reasons may favor our being partial to our children and 
projects. 
Portmore’s divorce of moral reasons from the balance of reasons, even 
if otherwise plausible, nonetheless cannot eliminate all of UI’s problems.  
It is offered as a solution to the problems of demandingness and its 
lesser included problems of self-effacement and natural partiality.  And 
it may succeed in solving them, though at the steep price of stripping 
morality of overridingness.  Portmore in essence argues that reason, but 
not morality, tracks (inversely) demandingess.  The more sacrifice an act 
requires of one, the less one has reason to do it. 
However, Portmore’s approach does not solve the problem of 
nonrecognition of rights. That is because the nonrecognition of rights 
problem is not a problem of demandingness.  Giving up one’s kidney 
may turn out to require very little sacrifice in terms of physical 
discomfort, loss of time, or increased risk.  If reason ruled out even that 
degree of sacrifice, morality would hardly ever outweigh self-interest in 
practical reasoning.  So Portmore should conclude that both morality and 
reason can require people to use their bodies, labors, and talents to 
benefit others, as UI theories prescribe.  And this means that the 
nonrecognition of rights problem is untouched by Portmore’s clever 
handling of demandingness problems.11 
The most common way UI proponents attempt to deal with the four 
objections is the familiar one of distinguishing between the end states 
that their theories deem valuable and the decision procedures by which 
we attempt to achieve those end states.  In other words, UI theorists 
adopt two-level, indirect consequentialist approaches.  Thus, although our 
desideratum is a world in which everyone has X share of Y good—where 
X represents the preferred UI distributional formula and Y represents the 
 
 10. See Douglas W. Portmore, Position-Relative Consequentialism, Agent-
Centered Options, and Supererogation, 113 ETHICS 303, 303–32 (2003); Douglas W. 
Portmore, Commonsense Morality and Not Being Required to Maximize the Overall 
Good, 100 PHIL. STUD. 193, 193–213 (2000). 
 11. Nor does contractualism handle the nonrecognition of rights problem, a point 
ably demonstrated by Jeffrey Brand-Ballard in Contractualism and Deontic Restrictions, 
114 ETHICS 269 (2004). 
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preferred UI currency—we will achieve such a world, or come as close 
as we can to achieving it, only if we do not attempt to achieve it in every 
act we undertake.  Perhaps we should go ahead and act with partiality 
toward kith and kin, with wholehearted devotion to our projects, and 
with a reluctance to be overly self-sacrificing.  Perhaps we should 
attribute to others rights that trump the outcomes of the UI calculus.  
And perhaps we should inculcate dispositions in our children (and 
ourselves) to be devoted to kith, kin, projects, and rights.  In other 
words, perhaps we can better achieve UI-preferred outcomes indirectly 
than directly. 
There is, again, extensive literature on indirect or two-level 
consequentialism.12  My own contributions to that literature, although 
they support the critique of direct, or act-consequentialism, nonetheless 
point out significant theoretical, as well as practical, difficulties with 
indirect or two-level consequentialism.13 
I am even more skeptical about indirect consequentialism as a solution 
to the nonrecognition of rights problem.  First, the rights that indirect 
consequentialist maneuvers generate are not metaphysically anchored.  
They are merely strategies for achieving extrinsic goals.  Second, and 
relatedly, their content will vary with circumstances.  They will have 
different content in different places, in different historical periods, and in 
the presence of different technologies.  That is not to say that they will 
differ isomorphically with circumstantial changes, for then indirect 
consequentialism would become direct (act-) consequentialism.  They 
will differ to some degree, however, whenever the circumstantial 
changes are significant.  Thus, to take an example, a right to favor one’s 
neighbors might be the best UI strategy in a world in which people know 
very little about the circumstances of non-neighbors.  As technology 
reduces the gap between knowledge about those nearby and knowledge 
about those far away, a right to favor one’s neighbors may become 
suboptimal for achieving UI-sought end states. 
Most importantly, however, there is no reason to believe that indirect 
consequentialist reasoning will produce precisely that set of rights that 
will solve the four problems.  The indirect consequentialist solutions to 
these problems typically have the quality of “just so” stories or 
 
 12. See, e.g., the various contributions in MORALITY, RULES, AND CONSEQUENCES: 
A CRITICAL READER (B. Hooker et al. eds., 2000). 
 13. See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 53–96 (2001); 
Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good-Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315, 315–32 (1985). 
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promissory notes: “We’ll show you later how the correct set of indirect 
consequentialist rights for producing UI-sought end states just is the set 
that permits partiality, avoids demandingness, and protects people’s 
bodies, labor, and talent against appropriation, but right now, just take 
our word that it does.”  I find it doubtful, however, that a convincing 
indirect consequentialist story can be told to explain on UI grounds, why 
a right should be recognized, say, against the nonvoluntary but safe, 
painless, and minimally time-consuming removal of a kidney to save 
another’s life.14 
In the end, I think that the four problems for UI theories remain 
unsolved.  And because these problems are common to all UI theories, 
and are serious enough to discredit all UI theories, it is worthwhile to 
examine RI theories to see if they offer a palatable alternative to UI 
theories. 
II.  RESTRICTED IMPARTIALITY 
RI theories of justice differ from UI theories in the following way: 
Whereas under UI theories all resources are in principle subject to the UI 
distributive formulae, under RI theories, the impartial formulae have a 
jurisdictional limit; they do not extend to persons’ bodies, labor, or 
talents (unless those persons consent).  Or, put differently, persons’ 
bodies, labor, and talents are not resources to be distributed according to 
some conception of impartiality in the way that land, water, rights to act, 
and so forth are up for distribution.  In RI theories, UI formulae have a 
restricted jurisdiction.15 
RI theories account for why we might claim a right to resist kidney 
transplantation, even if the discomfort, the disruption of our life, and the 
risk were minimal and the transplantation would maximize, equalize, 
prioritize, etc. welfare, opportunities for welfare, resources, capabilities, 
or whatever else UI dictates.  One’s kidneys are not a resource up for UI 
redistribution.  They are beyond its jurisdiction.  Our enforceable 
obligations to others are limited to those domains in which we interact in 
 
 14. A desperate tactic that UI proponents sometimes resort to is to make rights into 
goods that the UI theory seeks to realize.  I doubt the coherence of such a tactic.  But 
even on its own terms, it does not explain why those rights may not be violated for the 
purpose of minimizing rights violations.  (The “utilitarianism of rights” issue).  The UI 
proponent might fall back on a claim that rights against such rights violations are also UI 
goods, but that would just raise the question of why not allow right violations to 
minimize violations of those secondary rights, ad infinitum. 
 15. This jurisdictional distinction between UI and RI theories is quite similar to the 
position taken by Eric Mack that rights establish jurisdictions of agent-control.  See Eric 
Mack, In Defense of the Jurisdiction Theory of Rights, 4 J. ETHICS 71, 92–98 (2000); see 
also Keith Burgess-Jackson, Deontological Egoism, 29 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 357, 357–
85 (2003). 
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ways that threaten to make others worse off than had we not existed.  
Those obligations do not extend to those domains where our existence 
enables others to better themselves (over how they would fare in our 
absence) at our expense. 
The basic norm of all RI theories is the norm against appropriation—taking 
another’s bodies, labor, or talents without her consent.  RI theories 
distinguish between what one perhaps morally ought to do and what can 
be morally demanded of one.  Not everything that would maximize, 
equalize, prioritize, etc. can be demanded as opposed to requested. 
The norm against appropriation explains the right against kidney 
transplantation, even when the transplantation will cause minimal harm 
to the kidney’s possessor and greatly benefit the recipient.  And it leaves 
people with a domain in which they may be partial to specific people 
and projects.  It also explains the near universal intuition that redirecting 
a runaway trolley from its initial path, on which it will likely kill five 
innocent people, to a spur, on which it will likely kill one innocent 
person, is permissible, whereas a surgeon’s cutting up one healthy 
patient in order to harvest his organs and thereby save five dying patients 
is not.  The surgeon is appropriating his victim.  The one redirecting the 
trolley is not, for she does not need his body, labor, or talents to save the 
five and would turn the trolley in his absence.16  The nonappropriation 
norm is one—and I believe the most plausible—conception of the so-
called Doctrine of Double Effect.  And it also may lie behind (and 
qualify) the common assumption that doing harm is morally worse than 
allowing harm. 
Proponents of RI theories of justice are frequently called libertarians.17  
 
 16. The difficult case for the RI theorist is that of the trolley spur that loops 
around, so that whether the trolley proceeds down its initial course or down the spur 
track, it will hit and kill the five at precisely the same time.  Killing the one, however, 
will stop the trolley or slow it enough to give the five time to escape.  May one divert the 
trolley to the spur in such a case? 
Frances Kamm has argued that one may, at least so long as one has some reason for so 
diverting the trolley that is independent of the presence of the one on the spur.  See 
Frances M. Kamm, The Doctrine of Triple Effect and Why a Rational Agent Need Not 
Intend the Means to His End, 74 SUPPLEMENT TO THE PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 21, 
21–39 (2000).  I am not sure that I follow Kamm’s reasoning, but I would agree with her 
if she means that one may divert the trolley so long as he would divert the trolley even if 
no one were on the spur.  (Perhaps diverting the trolley would slow it just enough to give 
the five a few more seconds of life, or a less painful death, such that it would be worth 
the effort required to divert it.)  What the nonappropriation norm forbids is counting the 
crushing of the one and its effects as a decisive reason for diverting the trolley. 
 17. For an excellent summary of various libertarian positions, see Peter 
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Though I think that label is quite misleading, and that they are more 
accurately called nonappropriationists, I shall here also refer to them as 
libertarians. 
Libertarians differ among themselves over how resources other than 
bodies, labor, and talent should be distributed.  Those resources include 
land and other natural resources, of course, but also other things of value 
that people could enjoy in the absence of others. The liberty to engage in 
various activities is one such resource.  I could drive my car as I pleased 
were you not around.  You could walk in safety and without noise or 
fumes down the path where I wish to drive my car were I and my car not 
around.  Likewise, I could paint my house green were you not around, 
whereas you could enjoy a view unspoiled by green houses were I not 
around. 
I shall call the resources RI leaves open for distribution “common 
resources.”  Some libertarians—called left libertarians—would distribute 
the common resources equally.18  Of course, that is not as far “left” as 
left libertarians could go.  A left libertarian could advocate distributing 
those resources in favor of people who are worst off in terms of what 
their bodies, labor, and talents can secure them.  And there are other 
possible positions possible between this version of left libertariansim 
and the equal distribution position. 
Right libertarians favor principles such as first possession for 
distributing the common resources that are less patterned than those 
favored by left libertarians.19  And then there are centrist libertarians 
who would distribute the common resources in proportion to how people 
would fare on their own,20 or who accept first possession principles but 
limit them by various conceptions of Locke’s proviso that “enough and 
as good” shall be left for others to appropriate.21 
I shall return to the distribution of common resources shortly.  Here I 
 
Vallentyne, Libertarianism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (Fall 2002) at http://plato. 
stanford.edu/entries/libertarianism. 
 18. See, e.g., Hillel Steiner, Original Rights and Just Redistribution, in LEFT-
LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 74–99 (Peter Vallentyne 
& Hillel Steiner eds., 2000).  See generally LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS, 
supra. 
 19. See, e.g., Samuel Wheeler, Natural Property Rights as Body Rights, in LEFT-
LIBERTARIANISM AND ITS CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 18, at 228–
46. 
 20. See DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 190–232 (1987). 
 21. See Eric Mack, Self-ownership, Marxism, and egalitarianism. Part I: 
challenges to historical entitlement, 1 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 75, 75–108 (2002); Eric 
Mack, Self-ownership, Marxism, and egalitarianism. Part II: challenges to the self-
ownership thesis, 1 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 237, 237–76 (2002); Eric Mack, The Self-
Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean Proviso, 12 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 186, 
186–218 (1995). 
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want to correct a misconception of some libertarians—usually, left 
libertarians—about just what are common resources subject to 
distribution under RI.  I identified those resources as land and natural 
resources and also liberty to engage in activities and to enjoy 
experiences that would exist or that one could exercise or enjoy in the 
absence of those who are making conflicting claims on the resources.  
Some libertarians—Hillel Steiner, a left libertarian, is a prime 
example—believe that common resources include all land and natural 
resources.22  But that is incorrect. 
Consider the following simple scenario.  A and B are the only people.  
An apple tree is the only natural resource.  (The apple tree and its apples 
can represent land and other natural resources, but also activities and 
aesthetic experiences.)  A’s and B’s only talent is finding and picking 
apples.  A is short.  He can pick the apples only from the lower branches 
of the tree.  B is tall and has difficulty bending over.  He can pick the 
apples only from the upper branches of the tree.  There are some 
branches of the tree that both A and B can reach, but there are some that 
only one or the other of them can reach. 
Now apples are a natural resource.  They are not anyone’s body, labor, 
or talent.  But in the scenario I have described, not all the apples are 
common resources subject to distribution.  Why is that?  It is because in 
the absence of B, A would not be able to harvest all of the apples, and 
likewise for B in the absence of A.  A would only be able to obtain all of 
the apples if he could appropriate B’s body and talents to harvest the 
highest apples that A cannot reach (and likewise for B with respect to 
the lowest apples). The only apples that are common resources are the 
apples that both A and B can reach.  (Reaching, of course, refers not 
only to literally reaching, but is a stand in for such things as discovering 
previously undetected apples, or inventing new methods of harvesting 
otherwise inaccessible apples, such as step ladders and elongated 
shears.)23 
 
 22. See Steiner, supra note 18, at 78. 
 23. Consider a different example.  A and B have washed up on different islands.  
A’s island is lush, with plenty of food and building materials available.  A is able, 
without much exertion, to live a comfortable life.  On the other hand, B’s island is quite 
barren, and mere survival is a difficult and all consuming enterprise.  Neither A nor B is 
capable of traveling to the other’s island, although the currents make it possible for A to 
float food to B’s island.  However, given that fish swim between the two islands, A’s 
fishing depletes the supply of fish available to B.  In this scenario, the food and materials 
on A’s island are not common resources up for division because they would not be 
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Now this makes designating the domain of common resources to 
which RI applies quite complex, contrary to how some left libertarians 
seem to picture it.  If there are five bushels of apples on the tree, and A 
can reach the bottom two, and B the top four, then only the one bushel of 
apples that is found in the area of overlap is a common resource.  The 
bottom one bushel is A’s alone.  For B to obtain it without A’s consent 
would require B to coerce A into using A’s body, labor, and talents for 
B’s benefit.  And A is protected by the right against appropriation 
against such coercion.  Likewise, the top three bushels are B’s alone for 
the very same reason.  Only the second bushel from the bottom (fourth 
from the top) is neither A’s nor B’s under the right against appropriation 
and is therefore a common resource up for distribution according to 
some distributive formula.24 
As I said, the matter is complex because what is a common resource is 
not only determined by what one can physically obtain, but is also 
determined by individuals’ discoveries and inventions.  But the 
complexity is even greater because whereas A may have discovered a 
particular resource before B, B might have discovered it later, and in 
time to put it to some use.  The reason why first possession rules seem 
arbitrary to many is that they appear to give a lifetime of benefit to the 
first possessor even if the runner up is only a few seconds behind.  A 
resource that for some period is only one person’s should be later 
regarded as a common resource if it would have been discovered by or 
otherwise have become accessible to others with the passage of time. 
This is all that I shall say about common resources.  Where 
libertarians divide—or at least should divide—is over how those 
resources should be distributed.  Should they be distributed equally, for 
example, or should their distribution be sensitive to how well-off the 
various claimants are in terms of their noncommon resources?  In our 
apple tree scenario, for example, should A get all of the bushels of 
common apples because A begins with only one bushel, whereas B has 
three?  Or should A’s share be determined by what would maximize 
 
available to B in A’s absence.  (A will have to labor, even if minimally, to gather them 
and float them to B’s island.)  The fish, however, are common resources because they are 
available to each in the absence of the other. 
Finally, consider the inhabitants of the planet Paradise, who are wealthy beyond our 
imagination, and who possess the technology to send their wealth to Earth, though we 
lack the technology to exploit Paradise’s wealth on our own.  In that scenario, there are 
no common resources, unless and until the Paradisians begin to exploit resources that we 
do have access to, or do something to disturb our aesthetic employment of the heavens. 
 24. That formula might be equal distribution, so that this bushel is divided equally 
between A and B.  But it might instead be whatever distribution maximizes the least 
advantaged (A’s) position, which would result in A’s getting the entire bushel.  Or it 
might be divided in other ways that reflect A’s and B’s initial holdings. 
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aggregate welfare, or what A would get in a bargaining game with B?  
There are all sorts of possibilities here, particularly if one takes account 
of the dynamic effects of various formulae for distributing common 
property. 25  My aim here is not to recommend a distributive principle for 
common resources.  It is only to describe what common resources are 
and how they fit into the RI picture. 
I identified four problems faced by UI theories.  And I said that RI 
theories make room for rights, for partiality, and for projects.  RI theories 
also appear to be less demanding than UI theories.  The discovery of a new 
planet with billions of people living in misery will create no new 
enforceable obligations under RI, much less an obligation to transfer 
resources and thereby descend into a state of misery ourselves. 
RI theories do have their own serious problems, however.  The first is 
a demandingness problem that I shall call the absolutism problem.  RI is 
characterized by the right against appropriation, which right establishes 
the boundary beyond which impartial morality’s jurisdiction does not 
extend.  But the right against appropriation precludes not merely 
harvesting a kidney without consent to save another’s life.  It also 
precludes my touching your brow without your consent, even if doing so 
would save 1,000,000 lives.  Touching your brow is, after all, an 
appropriation of your body.  And the 1,000,000 lives would be doomed 
if you and your brow were not around, so that your refusal to consent 
does not make them any worse off than they would have been in your 
absence.  Therefore, although it would be horrid of you not to consent, it 
appears that the right against appropriation forbids me to touch your 
brow, regardless of the catastrophe that will follow. 
Libertarians quite naturally have sought to avoid this moral 
catastrophe objection by asserting that the absolutism of the right against 
appropriation gives way when the consequences are bad enough.  They 
advocate a “threshold deontology,” according to which the right against 
appropriation applies full bore up to some point at which the consequences 
of complying with the right’s demand become so severe that the right 
 
 25. Robert Nozick and Richard Epstein point out the possible wealth-enhancing 
effects of welfare-insensitive rules of distribution, such as first possession rules and 
strong property rights.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 176–77 
(1974); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 336–37 (1985).  David Gauthier argues for a more equal division of both 
common resources and surpluses from exchange.  See Eric Mack, Gauthier on Rights 
and Economic Rent, 9 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 171 (1992). 
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gives way to consequentialist concerns.26  I have elsewhere expressed 
my skepticism about this threshold deontology solution to the absolutism 
problem.27  In the absence of this or some other solution, however, the 
absolutism problem is potentially devastating for RI theories. 
The second major problem of RI theories is related to the absolutism 
problem.  It is what I shall call the desert problem.  It reflects an unhappy 
gulf in RI theories between how wrong an act is and how bad it is. 
Suppose that I can save 1,000,000 lives by touching your brow, but 
you refuse to consent to my doing so.  And suppose, further, that I 
nonetheless undertake an arduous and quite risky set of maneuvers that 
ultimately enable me to surprise you and touch your brow.  I thereby 
save the 1,000,000 lives.  But under RI, what I have done is wrong 
because it violates your right against appropriation. 
Ordinarily, when we knowingly violate, or attempt to violate or risk 
violating, others’ rights, we deserve punishment.  And ordinarily we believe 
that the amount of punishment we deserve tracks the seriousness of the 
wrong we commit.  Finally, we ordinarily believe that the seriousness of 
the wrongs we commit reflects the importance of the interests protected 
by the rights we violate or attempt to or risk violating—that is, that 
wrongness tracks badness.  But what punishment do I deserve in the case 
just described?  I may perhaps deserve a reward, but do I deserve punishment? 
Of course, touching your brow is a pretty minor thing, even if it 
violates your right against appropriation.  But suppose with great effort 
and at great risk I transplant your kidney against your will in order to 
save another’s life.  Taking your kidney is serious.  But do I deserve 
punishment, much less serious punishment?28 
Indeed, I find that although I am quite sympathetic to the normal 
 
 26. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 25, at 30. 
 27. Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 893, 
893–911 (2000).  The basic problem is that threshold deontology invites us to think of 
the right against appropriation as having a certain finite weight, which is why sufficiently 
bad consequences can overcome it.  But if consequences and the right against 
appropriation can be weighed against each other, or otherwise compared in terms of 
greater or less than, it must be because they are comparable in terms of something 
measurable.  Unfortunately, all they have in common in this respect are consequences, in 
which case UI will always outweigh the right against appropriation. 
There are even versions of RI that would reject the very notion of a moral catastrophe 
beyond an individual catastrophe, given that even when 1,000,000 die, no individual 
suffers more than his or her own death.  See, e.g., John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers 
Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293 (1977).  Attempts to account for the relevance of the 
number of affected people within an RI framework display the difficulty of the problem.  
See, e.g., Jens Timmerman, The individualist lottery: how people count, but not their 
numbers, 64 ANALYSIS 106 (2004). 
 28. For a glancing allusion to this problem, see Amartya Sen, Social Choice 
Theory and Justice, in CONSTRUCTIONS OF PRACTICAL REASON 158–61 (H. Pauer Studer 
ed., 2003). 
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reaction to the surgeon—namely, that he may not kill one in order to 
save five with harvested organs—the question of whether he deserves 
punishment, and whether, if so, he deserves the same punishment that 
most killers deserve, I find perplexing. 
Although the absolutism problem has received some philosophical 
attention, the desert problem remains, to my knowledge, essentially 
untouched.  The problem is at root a reflection of RI’s limited jurisdiction, 
which creates a discontinuity not present in UI theories.  In the latter, the 
farther we deviate from what UI requires, the more wrong our act and 
the more punishment we deserve (assuming our UI theory makes room 
for desert).  But under RI theories, an act can be RI wrong but otherwise 
UI mandated. 
I do not know whether the desert problem has a solution.  I surely 
have none to offer.  But I am sure that the desert problem is one that RI 
theories, to be tenable, must ultimately solve. 
A third problem for RI theories is children.  Children are the products 
of their parents’ labor, so why is it that parents do not own their 
children?  Moreover, if parents have not made their children worse off 
by bringing them into existence, why do we suppose that parents must 
use their bodies, labor, and talents for their children’s benefit? 
A fourth problem for RI theories is whether they can justify a ban on 
selling oneself into slavery.  Libertarians do believe that we are free to 
bind ourselves contractually to labor (or to donate, say, blood), and some 
believe that we can create thereby enforceable obligations that can be 
specifically enforced (as they were in the United States before peonage 
was outlawed, and as they are even today in the context of the 
military).29  It is only a short step from peonage and the military to 
voluntary slavery, morally speaking, but most libertarians do not endorse 
the complete alienability of the right against appropriation.  If any line 
exists along the spectrum of degrees of alienation of this right, however, 
it requires a theoretical defense. 
A fifth problem for RI theories, like the slavery problem, arises from 
those theories’ endorsement of a right to make voluntary transfers of 
goods and labor as a corollary of the right of self-ownership (the right 
against appropriation).  The right to transfer goods voluntarily is not 
itself derivable from the right against appropriation in any logically tight 
 
 29. There are, of course, practical problems with specifically enforcing affirmative 
obligations, but perhaps they will succumb to technological solutions. 
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sense, but it seems to be a natural concomitant of the liberty that that 
right protects. 
The difficulty is that RI theories never specify what the necessary and 
sufficient conditions are for a transfer to be voluntary and hence capable 
of changing parties’ moral rights and duties regarding goods and actions.  
No transferor possesses all the information that might possibly bear on 
whether the transfer will subsequently be regretted.  Nor is any transferor 
completely free of motivational pressures.  (If he were completely free, 
his transfer would be unmotivated, which is not the paradigm of a 
voluntary transfer.)  But when do ignorance or motivational pressures or 
both defeat voluntariness and hence the ability to transfer moral rights 
and duties?  RI theories need to tell us. 
The sixth problem for RI theories is an obvious one, namely, how to 
divide up the commons—those resources that are not subject to the self-
ownership right against appropriation.  I pointed out that the logic of 
self-ownership restricts the definition of the commons to those resources 
that would be available to each of the competing parties in the absence 
of the others.  In my apple tree example, the very highest and lowest 
apples would not be part of the commons for A and B.  On the other 
hand, an apple that would not be part of the commons relative to A and 
B might be part of the commons relative to A and C or B and C; for C 
might be able to reach some of the apples that B cannot reach but A can, 
or some of the apples A cannot reach but B can.  So the introduction of 
more people complicates the identification of the commons—or more 
precisely, of the multiple commons. 
Beyond this multiplicity of commons difficulty, which is endemic to 
RI, there are the problems of allocating the commons that RI theories 
share with UI theories, namely, what currency (welfare, resources, and 
so forth) and what distributional formula (equality, priority, and so 
forth) to utilize. The extreme right libertarians attempt to avoid these 
problems by essentially denying the existence of a commons.  Their 
denial is, however, implausible, especially when one considers, not 
resources like apples, but rather resources in the form of liberties.  If A 
prefers loud music and B prefers peace and quiet, who has the liberty 
that the other must respect is an allocation of the commons problem 
every bit as much as who can get the apples in the middle of the tree.  
And it is not obvious how right libertarians’ first possession principle 
applies in this case: if quiet preexists noise, does it win out? 
Center libertarians generally would allow free appropriation of the 
commons by first appropriators—again, what does that mean in the case 
of music versus quiet?—so long as the first appropriators compensate 
others in a way that returns them to their pre-appropriation indifference 
curves.  And left libertarians would divide the commons equally, or 
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perhaps unequally, by giving larger shares to those worse off prior to the 
division.  Both types need a metric to go with their formulae.  And that 
will be as difficult for them as for UI theorists.  Take the case of the 
apple tree again.  Suppose A cannot reach the apples high on the tree, 
but he can see them.  So even if he cannot eat them, he can enjoy them 
aesthetically.  Are they then part of the commons relative to A and B?  
Must B compensate A when B picks them?  Suppose A cannot see them 
but knows they are there and takes pleasure in that knowledge—just as 
people take pleasure in knowing that a wilderness area is unspoiled, even 
if they never plan to visit it or experience its unspoiled nature in any 
other way.30  Are the high apples now part of the A-B commons?  
Likewise, if sending the Martian lander will disturb people who believe 
Mars has religious significance and that the lander will desecrate it—even if 
those people cannot themselves observe Mars or the lander—must they 
be compensated for a taking from their commons, and if so, to what 
extent?  Both UI and RI theories must handle cases such as these. 
There is, finally, a problem of RI theories that may be less a problem 
internal to RI theories and more a problem with the coherence of those 
theories.  I shall call this the lottery problem.  Someone could argue that 
our sense that we have a right to, for example, our kidneys is a product 
of a failure of imagination.  For imagine that prior to birth, human 
fetuses were featureless, and their physical and mental attributes were 
entirely the product of human choices regarding to whom various 
physical and mental characteristics should be distributed.  (Imagine a 
warehouse containing both good and bad kidneys, from which the 
fetuses are distributed their kidneys according to some human plan.)  If 
that is how we acquired our bodies, our willingness to labor, and our 
talents, would we then believe we had a Aright@ to them sufficient to 
block their redistribution according to a proper UI formula?31 
If one thinks the answer is “no,” one might conclude that RI theories 
should therefore be rejected, particularly if one thinks that the way we 
do obtain our attributes is relevantly similar to the imagined system.32  
 
 30. Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations 
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1346–48 (1974). 
 31. Richard Arneson first mentioned this view to me in conversation, although he 
could not recall its source in the literature.  It has some affinity to views expressed by 
Derek Parfit.  See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 321–47 (1984). 
 32. Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Talent Pooling, in HUMAN RIGHTS 58–79 (J. 
Pennock & J. Chapman eds., 1981) (discussing the implications of the idea that our 
talents should be treated as part of a common pool of resources). 
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(Indeed, given the potential of genetic engineering and re-engineering, 
the actual similarity will undoubtedly become even greater.)  I am not 
sure that this view is correct.  But this potentially fatal critique of RI 
theories does call for a response. 
* * * * * 
That is all I have to say.  My aim, as I said, was to point out a major 
fault line in liberal political/morality that defines two quite different 
branches.  Each branch has its own distinct problems.  And each branch 
has its advantages, advantages that correspond to the problems of the 
other branch. 
It is not my aim to minimize the importance of the intramural 
arguments within each of these branches.  Within UI, the arguments over 
the proper currency and distributional formula are surely worth careful 
attention, particularly if UI theories as a group hold the high ground.  
The same is true of the disputes within RI among left, right, and center 
libertarians.  But can UI theories meet the RI objections, and vice versa?  
That, too, is an important question, and in terms of what turns on it, the 
most important of all. 
 
